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56 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
under the first indictment upon the facts alleged in the second, but he
could be convicted of the lesser crime upon the first indictment as the
greater crime includes the smaller.' 7 If the acts alleged in the second
indictment are used against the defendant in the first, it is manifest that
there is double jeopardy.' 8
Where there are two transactions and two separate crimes arise,10
or where there is a repetition of the same crime,20 a prosecution for one
offense is clearly no bar to the other. If there is only one transaction
and separate and distinct statutes are violated, the same result is
reached. 2 '
Where there is a failure to perform a legal duty, that omission of
duty cannot be divided into separate offenses, because one prosecution
will be a bar to subsequent proceedings.22
The principal case is consistent with those cases holding that crimes
arising out of one transaction and invading the rights of two persons
are separate and distinct offenses. Plainly, the defendant is not being
put in double jeopardy when prosecuted separately for the offense against
each victim. Just as the victims are different, the offenses are different.
C. C. BENNETT.
Criminal Law-Solicitation.
The defendant told a fifteen-year-old boy that if he would set fire to
a certain dwelling he would reward him with a pistol and furnish him
with the necessary matches and oil. The boy assented to the plan but
upon leaving the defendant, disclosed it to the officers. The North
rape. It is believed this statute would alter the result reached in this case, mak-
ing it consistent with the other cases).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§4639, 4640.
State v. Lindsay, 61 N. C. 468 (1867) ; State v. Lawson and Cheatham, 123
N. C. 740, 31 S. E. 667 (1898) ; State v. Freeman, 162 N. C. 594, 77 S. E. 780,(1913) ; Cf. State v. Hankins, 136 N. C. 621, 48 S. E. 593 (1904).
" State v. Robinson, 116 N. C. 1047, 21 S. E. 701 (1895) (concealed weapon-
assault and battery); State v. Hooker, 145 N. C. 581, 59 S. E. 866 (1907)
(stealing-breaking and entering) ; State v. Mansfield, 207 N. C. 233, 176 S. E. 761
(1934) (bastardy-abandonment).
0 State v. Williams, 94 N. C. 891 (1886) (selling liquor to different persons);
State v. White, 146 N. C 608, 60 S. E. 505 (1908) (carrying concealed weapon
on different occasions); State v. Jones, 201 N. C. 424, 160 S. E. 468 (1931)
(abandonment of children).
'State v. Pierce, 208 N. C. 47, 179 S. E. 8 (1935) (burning barn-burning
personal property in barn).
' State v. Roberson, 136 N. C. 591, 48 S. E. 596 (1904) (prosecution for fail-
ure to get an annual license bars a further prosecution within the year) ; State v.
Commissioners of Fayetteville, 6 N. C. 371 (1818) (prosecution for failure to
keep one street in repair bars a further prosecution as to other streets in disrepair
at the same time) ; cf. State v. Jones, 201 N. C. 424, 160 S. E. 468 (1931) (failure
to support children is continuing offense and prosecution therefore is not barred
by conviction for prior time).
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Carolina Supreme Court held the defendant guilty of the common-law
offense of soliciting the commission of a felony.1
This is a case of first impression in North Carolina, though the
solicitation of another to commit a felony was ruled a common-law of-
fense in Rex v. Higgi=2 in 1801. The holding of the principal case
is in line with the overwhelming weight of authority.3
The offense of solicitation, a misdemeanor, 4 is complete when the
solicitor has attempted to persuade another to commit a crime.
Whether or not the person solicited consents, or having consented,
makes an effort to commit the crime is of no moment.5 The act of so-
liciting is punishable as it, in and of itself, is sufficient to take the case
out of the sphere of mere intent.
A few states have made solicitation an offense by statutory enact-
ment.6 In the absence of statutes it has been held indictable as a com-
mon-law offense to solicit any person to commit larceny,7 murder,8
arson,0 sodomy,10 assault and battery,1" and adultery.' 2
'State v. Tony Hampton, 210 N. C. 283, 186 S. E. 251 (1936).
'2 East. 5. The defendant solicited a servant to steal his master's goods. Held:
defendant guilty of a misdemeanor, although the indictment did not charge that
the servant stole the goods, nor that any other act waA done other than the so-
liciting.
'United States v. Galleanni, 245 Fed. 977 (D. C. D. Mass. 1917); State v.
Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 Atl. 805 (1923); State v. Donovan, 28 Del. 40, 90
At. 220 (1914) ; Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545 (1883) ; People v. Ham-
mond, 132 Mich. 422, 93 N. W. 1084 (1903); State v. Sullivan, 110 Mo. App. 75,
84 S. W. 105 (1904); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 83, 23 At. 388
(1892) ; State v. Bowers, 35 S. C. 262, 14 S. E. 488 (1892) ; Wiseman v. Com-
"monwealth, 143 Va. 631, 130 S. E. 249 (1925) ; Rudolph v. State, 128 Wis. 222,
107 N. W. 466 (1906) ; see State v. Hudon, 103 Vt. 17, 20, 151 Atl. 562, 564 (1930) ;
Blackburn, Solicitation to Cri-me (1934) 40 W. VA.. L. REV. 135. But see Cox
v. People, 82 Ill. 191, 192, 193 (1876) ; 1 BISHoP, CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed. 1923)
§768, c. 2; 1 MCCLAIN, CRIMINAL LAW (1897) §220.
'State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266 (1828); State v. Sullivan, 110 Mo. App. 75, 84
S. W. 105 (1904) ; Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. 405 (1897).
'United States v. Galleanni, 245 Fed. 977 (D. C. D. Mass. 1917) ; State v. Don-
ovan, 28 Del. 40, 90 Atl. 220 (1914); Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545
(1883); People v. Hammond, 132 Mich. 422, 93 N. W. 1084 (1903); State v.
Bowers, 35 S. C. 262, 14 S. E. 488 (1892) ; see State v. Hudon, 103 Vt 17, 20, 151
Atl. 562, 564 (1930).
'CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering, 1935) §653f (solicitation of certain felonies);
CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §6072 (solicitation of injury to person or property);
IOWA CODE (1935) §12917 (solicitation of murder); VT. PUB. LAws (1933) c.
349, §8746 (solicitation of felonies).
I State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 At. 805 (1923).
'Commonwealth v. Randolph, 146 Pa. 83, 23 Atl. 388 (1892); see State v.
Lourie, 12 S. W. (2d) 43, 45 (Mo. 1928).
'State v. Donovan, 28 Del. 40, 90 Atl. 220 (1914) ; Commonwealth v. Flagg,
135 Mass. 545 (1883) ; Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. 405 (1897);
State v. Bowers, 35 S. C. 262, 14 S. E. 488 (1892)
" See State v. George, 79 Wash. 262, 140 Pac. 337, 339 (1914).
'United States v. Lyman, Fed. Cas. No. 15646 (C. C. D. Mass. 1818).
"State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266 (1828). Contra: Smith v. Commonwealth, 54
Pa. 209 (1867) (adultery in Pa. was a misdemeanor, not a felony).
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Though the crime is apparently clear and definite there has been
much confusion in its application. Not infrequently it has been con-
fused with an attempt to commit a crime.' 3 The soliciting of another
is not a sufficient act--"a step in the direction of the crime"i-to
constitute an attempt, and as against one who is merely guilty of solicita-
tion an indictment for an attempt will not lie.' 4 Further, solicitation
may be distinguished from an attempt as it is the act of a person who
solicits another to commit a, crime; while an attempt is the act of one
who himself intends to commit the crime. Both are substantive offenses
and should be treated as separate and distinct.
Though the courts have almost unanimously held the solicitation of a
felony to be an offense, the courts differ when the solicitation is of a mis-
demeanor. One line of authority rules that there can be no offense of so-
licitation of a misdemeanor, 15 while another rules it a crime if the misde-
meanor is of a "high or aggravated type". 16 The latter view seems the
better, as the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors is usually
arbitrary, being governed by no fixed or definite principles, as there is
apparently no intrinsic difference between the two.'1 Also, often, cer-
tain misdemeanors are more detrimental to the interests of society
than many of the felonies. The solicited crime in the principal case be-
ing that of arson, the North Carolina court was not called upon to
rule on the misdemeanor problem.
It is to be hoped that in the future the North Carolina doctrine of
solicitation will be extended to include "high or aggravated misde-
meanors".
S. J. STERN, JR.
"See State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 438, 439, 440, 121 At. 805, 806, 807
(1923) ; State v. Lavine, 96 N. J. 356, 358, 115 Atl. 335, 336 (1921) ; State v. Bow-
ers, 35 S. C. 262, 264, 14 S. E. 488, 489 (1892) ; State v. George, 79 Wash. 262, 140
Pac. 337, 338 (1914) ; State v. Bailer, 26 W. Va. 90, 92 (1885).
1State v. Donovan, 28 Del. 40, 90 AtI. 220 (1914); State v. Bowles, 70
Kan. 821, 79 Pac. 726 (1905) ; McDade v. People, 29 Mich. 50 (1874) ; State v.
Lampe, 131 Minn. 65, 154 N. W. 737 (1915); State v. Davis, 319 Mo. 1222, 6
S. W. (2d) 609 (1928) ; Stabler v. Commonwealth, 95 Pa. 318 (1880); Hicks v.
Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 9 S. E. 1024 (1889) ; State v., Butler, 8 Wash. 194,
35 Pac. 1093 (1894) ; State v. Bailer, 26 W. Va. 90 (1885) ; CLARK AND MARSHALL,
CRIMES (3d ed. 1927) §133. Contra: State v. Taylor, 47 Ore. 455, 84 Pac. 82
(1906); BIsHoP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1913) §74.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 54 Pa. 209 (1867) ; CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRIIES
(3d ed. 1927) §132.
"State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 At. 805 (1923); Cox v. People, 82
Ill. 191 (1876) ; Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. 405 (1897) ; State v.
Keyes, 8 Vt. 57 (1836) ; see United States v. Galleanni, 245 Fed. 977, 978 (D. C. D.
Mass. 1917) ; Commonwealth v. Flagg, 135 Mass. 545, 549 (1883) ; State v. But-
ler, 8 Wash. 194, 35 Pac. 1093, 1094 (1894).
x' "The statutory classification of crime, as felony or misdemeanor, is governed
by no fixed or definite principle, but is purely arbitrary. Legislative whim or
caprice may alone determine in Which category an offense, not a felony at common
law, shall be placed." Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 6 Pa. Super. 405, 409 (1898).
